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Suicide or murder, this move has taken Pakistan back to where it began%26mdash;as a poor, developing nation with great promise that had been ruined by 60 years of bad administration and an opportunistic and dominating military which effectively seals off any democratic impulses. %26quot;We are in 2008, but Pakistan is back to 1958,%26quot; Nasir, a reader of the popular Pakistani Web site pkpolitics.com, posted sorrowfully on its site on Nov. 4. The country has been led by military rule or martial law for more years than it has by democratic election, and, judging by the army’s support for Musharraf’s recent unpopular move, the generals are in no hurry to return to the barracks.
That Musharraf has overplayed his hand is obvious. Blaming his own nine-year rule for increased terrorist activity and a newly emboldened judiciary, as an excuse to prevent a democratic election, is audacious%26mdash;and could prove foolhardy.
Military’s Risky Turn Against ExtremistsWhat is less apparent is that for the first time, the Pakistani army may have serious reason to reconsider its place in the country. Over the years, a once-popular army has lost its luster for the population. In the early days of Musharraf’s rule, the military maintained goodwill. Even after 2001, when Musharraf entered into a close embrace with the U.S. as an ally and got his country badly needed economic aid, the army was tolerated%26mdash;despite its obvious links with extremists in the region.
The double game was exposed when the extremists%26mdash;Musharraf’s core constituency after the military%26mdash;were targeted by his army under pressure from the U.S. In 2006, the Pakistani army lost nearly 100 soldiers fighting extremists and Al Qaeda in the wilds of Waziristan in eastern Pakistan. That number has increased dramatically to more than 700 in 2007%26mdash;600 alone since July, according to Eurasia Group, a political risk analysis outfit based in New York.
This matters, because more than 25% of Pakistan’s foot soldiers come from the same tribal areas and they are not inclined to fight their own people. Several hundred soldiers have been court-martialed this year for refusing to fight in the region. Army rule has ensured that most state benefits are funneled into Punjab, the most prosperous state in the country with the majority of army recruits. The eastern tribal regions, on the other hand, have suffered from decades of neglect and lack of development. In the absence of strong administrative machinery, these regions have held together on the old tribal loyalty system. The influx of foreign fighters, which has made the tribal areas a haven for terrorists, has broken down the old loyalties. Here, more than anywhere else in Pakistan, the army is viewed with suspicion for fighting America’s war, not Pakistan’s.
New Rulers of a Feudalistic SocietyOver the years, the military has taken control over all other aspects of Pakistan%26mdash;political and economic. There is very little private business in Pakistan compared with the army’s vast commercial interests. The army is the largest landowner in Pakistan (12% of the country’s land), the largest corporation, the largest nongovernment organization, the largest farmer. It consumes more than 50% of the country’s annual budget, in addition to the annual $2 billion in military aid it receives from the U.S. Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent security and strategic affairs analyst in Pakistan, and author of the bold <cite>Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy</cite>, estimates the army’s business interests at more than $4 billion. Over the years it has co-opted civilian institutions such as the Education Ministry and even the Cricket Board, with military officers heading them. Army officers have become the new rulers of an already deeply feudalistic society.
